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1 Introduction
In several recent publications, it has been shown that there is a wealth like measure that can
serve as an index of intergenerational welfare. The index enables one (a) to check whether welfare
will be sustained along an economic forecast, and (b) to conduct social cost-benefit analysis of
policy reforms (e.g., investment projects). Excepting under special circumstances, however, the
index in question is not wealth itself, but an adaptation of wealth. Interestingly, the results do not
require the economy to be convex, nor do they require the assumption that the government
optimizes on behalf of its citizens.
1
An economy's wealth is the worth of its capital assets. As is widely recognised today, the
list of assets should include not only manufactured capital, but also human capital (health,
knowledge, and skills), and natural capital. Formally, an economy's wealth is a linear combination
of its capital stocks, the weights awarded to the stocks being the latter's accounting prices.
The term accounting prices was used originally in the literature on economic planning
(Tinbergen, 1954). The underlying presumption there was that governments are intent on
maximizing social welfare. Public investment criteria were subsequently developed for economies
enjoying good governance (Little and Mirrlees, 1968, 1974; Arrow and Kurz, 1970). In its turn the
now-extensive literature exploring various concepts of sustainable development has also been
directed at societies where governments choose policies so as to maximize intergenerational
welfare.
2
Sustainability is different from optimality. To ask whether collective well-being is sustained
along an economic forecast is to ask, roughly speaking, whether the economy's production
possibility set is growing. The concept of sustainability is useful for judging the performance of
economies where the government, whether by design or incompetence, does not choose policies that
maximise intergenerational welfare. One can argue, therefore, that the term "sustainable
development" acquires particular bite when it is put to work in imperfect economies, that is,
economies suffering from weak, or even bad, governance. Recently the theory of intertemporal
welfare indices has been extended to such economies.
3 The theory's reach therefore now extends
to actual economies. The theory has also been put to use in a valuable paper by Hamilton and
Clemens (1999) for judging whether in the recent past countries have invested sufficiently to
expand their productive bases.
4 Among the resources making up natural capital, only commercial     
5 The material in Section 2 has been taken from Dasgupta and Mäler (2000) and Dasgupta
(2001a,b).
5
forests, oil and minerals, and the atmosphere as a sink for carbon dioxide were included in the
Hamilton-Clemens work. Not included were water resources, forests as agents of carbon
sequestration, fisheries, air and water pollutants, soil, and biodiversity. Nor were discoveries of oil
and mineral reserves taken into account. Moreover, there is a certain awkwardness in several of the
steps Hamilton and Clemens took when estimating changes in the worth of an economy's capital
assets. Our aim in this paper is to clarify a number of issues that arise in putting the theory of
welfare indices to practical use. It is our hope that the findings documented here will prove useful
in future empirical work.
We are interested in three related questions: (1) How should accounting prices be estimated?
(2) How should we evaluate policy change in an imperfect economy? (3) How can we check
whether intergenerational well-being will be sustained along a projected economic programme?
For simplicity, we confine our analysis until Section 14 to a deterministic world. In Section
2 we rehearse the basic theory.
5 We prove that the same set of accounting prices should be used
both for policy evaluation and for assessing whether or not intergenerational welfare along a given
economic path will be sustained. We also show that a comprehensive measure of wealth, computed
in terms of the accounting prices, can be used as an index for problems (2) and (3) above. These
results do not require that the economy be convex, nor do they depend on the assumption that the
government optimizes on behalf of its citizens subject to constraints.
In Section 3 we use the Ramsey-Solow model of national saving in a convex economy to
illustrate the theory. In Section 4 we show that the theory can be put to use in non-convex
economies by studying a particular class of ecosystems, namely, shallow lakes. The remainder of
the paper is concerned with rules for estimating the accounting prices of specific environmental
natural resources, transacted in a few well known economic institutions.
In order to make our findings easily accessible for empirical work, we report our findings
as a catalogue of results. Rules for estimating accounting prices of exhaustible natural resources
under both free and restricted entry are derived in Section 5. In Section 6 we show how expenditure
toward the discovery of new deposits ought to be incorporated in national accounts. Section 7
develops methods for including forest depletion; and in Section 8 we show how the production of
human capital could be taken into account. In Section 9 we study the valuation of global public
goods.
If an economy were to face exogenous movements in certain variables, its dynamics would
not be autonomous in time. Non-autonomy in time introduces additional problems for the
construction of the required welfare index, in that the wealth measure requires to be augmented.
Exogenous growth in factor productivities, for example, is a potential reason for non-autonomous
dynamics. In Section 10 we show that by suitably redefining variables, it is often possible to     
6 In a companion paper (Arrow, Dasgupta, and Mäler, 2003) we have developed criteria for
identifying sustainable development under changing population size in optimizing economies.
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transform a non-autonomous economic system into one that is autonomous. But such helpful
transformations are not available in many other cases. In Section 11 we show that the required
welfare index can nevertheless be constructed, by studying a small country exporting an exhaustible
natural resource at a price that is time-dependent. The way defensive expenditure against pollution
ought to be included in national accounts is discussed in Section 12.
The theory developed upto and including Section 12 assumes that population remains
constant. In Section 13 we extend the theory to cover population change.
6 In Section 14 we show
how future uncertainty in commodity transformation possibilities can be incorporated. Section 15
contains concluding remarks.
2. The Basic Model
2.1 Preliminaries
We assume that the economy is closed. Time is continuous and is denoted variously by J
and t (J, t $ 0). The horizon is taken to be infinite. For simplicity of exposition, we aggregate
consumption into a single consumption good, C, and let R denote a vector of resource flows (e.g.,
rates of extraction of natural resources, expenditure on education and health). Labour is supplied
inelastically and is normalised to be unity. Intergenerational welfare (henceforth, "social welfare")
at t ($ 0) is taken to be of the Ramsey-Koopmans form,
Wt = t*4U(CJ)exp(-*(J-t))dJ,( * > 0), (1)
where the utility function, U(C), is strictly concave and monotonically increasing.
The state of the economy is represented by the vector K, where K is a comprehensive list
of capital assets. The economy under study faces not only technological and ecological constraints,
but also a wide variety of institutional constraints. By the economy's "institutions" we mean market
structures, property rights, tax rates, non-market arrangements for credit, insurance, and common
property resources, the character of various levels of government, and so forth. We do not assume
that the government is necessarily bent on maximizing social welfare subject to constraints. It could
be that the government is predatory, or is at best neglectful, and has objectives of its own that are
not congruent with social welfare. Nor do we imagine institutions to be unchanging over time. What
we do assume is that institutions coevolve with the state of the economy (K) in ways that are
understood. It is no doubt a truism that social and political institutions influence the evolution of
the state of an economy, but it has also been argued by political scientists (Lipset, 1959) that the
state of an economy (K) influences the evolution of social and political institutions. The theory we
develop below accommodates this mutual influence.
Let {CJ,  RJ,  KJ}t
4 be an economic programme from t to 4. Given technological
possibilities, resource availabilities, and the dynamics of the ecological-economic system, the
decisions made by individual agents and consecutive governments from t onwards will determine7
CJ, RJ, and KJ  -  for J $ t  -  as functions of Kt, J, and t. Thus let f(Kt, J, t), g(Kt, J, t), and h(Kt,
J, t), respectively, be consumption, the vector of resource flows, and the vector of capital assets at
date J ($ t) if Kt is the vector of capital assets at t. Now write
(>J)t
4 / {CJ, RJ, KJ}t
4, for t $ 0. (2)
Let {t, Kt} denote the set of possible t and Kt pairs, and {(>J)t
4} the set of economic programmes
from t to infinity.
Definition 1 A resource allocation mechanism, ", is a (many-one) mapping
": {t, Kt} 6 {(>J)t
4}. (3)
It bears emphasis that we do not assume that " maps {t, Kt} into to optimum economic
programmes (starting at t), nor even that it maps {t, Kt} into efficient programmes (starting at t).
The following analysis is valid even if " is riddled with economic distortions and inequities. Nor
do we assume, in defining ", that the economy's institutions are fixed. If institutions and the state
of the economy were known to coevolve, that coevolution would be reflected in ". Note too that
we do not assume commodity transformation possibility sets to be convex. This is significant,
because ecological processes involve transformation possibility sets that are frequently non-convex;
displaying, for example, threshold effects. The reason we are able to accommodate non-convex
production structures is that we are developing welfare economics in imperfect economies: we
assume that the government (rather, some honest agency in government) seeks only to institute
policy reform. For an optimizing government the matter would be different. As the Second
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics makes clear, production structures need to be convex
if the optimum allocation is to be decentralized.
Definition 2 " is time-autonomous (henceforth autonomous) if for all J $ t, >J is a
function solely of Kt and (J-t).
Notice that if " is autonomous, economic variables at date J ($ t) are functions of Kt and
(J-t) only. " would be non-autonomous if, for example, knowledge or the terms of trade (for a
trading economy) were to change exogenously over time. In certain cases exogenous changes in
population size would mean that " is not autonomous. However, by suitably redefining state
variables, non-autonomous resource allocation mechanisms can sometimes be mapped into
autonomous mechanisms (Sections 10 and 13).
Definition 3 " is time-consistent if
h(KJN,J",JN) = h(Kt,J",t), for all J", JN, and t.( 4 )
Time-consistency implies a weak form of rationality. An autonomous resource allocation
mechanism, however, has little to do with rationality; it has to do with the influence of external
factors (e.g., whether trade prices are changing autonomously). In what follows, we assume that "
is time-consistent.
Definition 4 The value function reflects social welfare (equation (1)) as a function of initial
capital stocks and the resource allocation mechanism. We write this as     
7 Differentiability everywhere is a strong assumption. For practical purposes, however, it would
suffice to assume that V is differentiable in Ki almost everywhere. The latter would appear to be a
reasonable assumption even when production possibilities (including ecological processes) are
realistically non-convex. See Section 4 below. However, if the location of these points on the space
of capital stocks is uncertain and the uncertainty a smooth probability distribution, the expected
value of Vt would be continuous.
8
Wt = V(Kt, ", t). (5)
In what follows, we will often write V(Kt, ", t) = Vt.
Let Ki be the ith capital stock. We assume that V is differentiable in K.
7
Definition 5 The accounting price, pit, of the ith capital stock is defined as
pit = MV(Kt, ", t)/MKit / MVt/MKit.( 6 )
Note that accounting prices are defined in terms of hypothetical perturbations to an
economic forecast. Specifically, the accounting price of a capital asset is the present discounted
value of the perturbations to U that would arise from a marginal increase in the quantity of the asset.
Given the resource allocation mechanism, accounting prices at t are functions of Kt, and possibly
of t as well (i.e., pit = pi(Kt,t)). The prices depend also on the extent to which various capital assets
are substitutable for one another. It should be noted that accounting prices of private "goods" can
be negative if property rights are dysfunctional, such as those that lead to the tragedy of the
commons. Note too that if " is autonomous, accounting prices are not explicit functions of time,
and so, pit = pi(Kt).
2.2 Marginal Rates of Substitution vs Market Observables
Using (1) and (6), it can be shown that, if " is autonomous, pit satisfies the dynamical
equation,
dpit/dt = *pit - UN(Ct)MCt/MKit - EjpjtM(dKjt/dt)/MKi.( 7 )
(7) reduces to Pontryagin equations for co-state variables in the case where " is an optimum
resource allocation mechanism. In any event, we show below that, in order to study the evolution
of accounting prices under simple resource allocation mechanisms, it is often easier to work directly
with (6).
From (6) it also follows that accounting price ratios (pit/pjt, piJ/pit, and consumption discount
rates (see below)) are defined as marginal social rates of substitution between goods. In an economy
where the government maximizes social welfare, marginal rates of substitution among goods and
services equal their corresponding marginal rates of transformation. As the latter are observable in
market economies (e.g. border prices for traded goods in an open economy), accounting prices are
frequently defined in terms of marginal rates of transformation among goods and services.
However, marginal rates of substitution in imperfect economies do not necessarily equal the
corresponding marginal rates of transformation. A distinction therefore needs to be made between
the ingredients of social welfare and "market observables". Using market observables to infer social
welfare can be misleading in imperfect economies. That we may have to be explicit about welfare     
8 It is not our purpose to review the several ways in which sustainable development can be, and
has been, defined. Pezzey (1992) contains an early, but thorough, classification.
     
9 For convenience we have defined sustainability only for a moment in time. One could insist
on the infinitely more demanding requirement: dVt/dt $ 0 for all t. Readers can confirm that our
results can be rephrased in the obvious manner to be in accordance with this stiffer condition.
     
10 One of us (KJA) has produced an example of an optimum economic programme displaying
the latter feature.
9
parameters (e.g. * and the elasticity of U) in order to estimate marginal rates of substitution in
imperfect economies is not an argument for pretending that the economies in question are not
imperfect after all. In principle it could be hugely misleading to use the theory of optimum control
to justify an exclusive interest in market observables.
2.3 Genuine Investment as a Measure of Sustainable Development
IUCN (1980) and World Commission (1987) introduced the concept of sustainable
development. The latter publication defined sustainable development to be "... development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs" (World Commission, 1987: 43). Several formulations are consistent with this phrase.
But the underlying idea is straightforward enough: we seek a measure that would enable us to judge
whether an economy's production possibility set is, in a loose sense, growing. Our analysis is based
on an interpretation of sustainability that is based on the maintainence of social welfare, rather than
on the maintainenance of the economy's productive base. We then show that the requirement that
economic development be sustainable implies, and is implied by, the requirement that the
economy's productive base be maintained (Theorems 1-3). These results give intellectual support
for the definition of sustainability we adopt here.
8
Definition 6 The economic programme {Ct, Rt, Kt}0
4 corresponds to a sustainable
development path at t if dVt/dt $ 0.
9
Notice that the above criterion does not attempt to identify a unique economic programme.
In principle any number of technologically and ecologically feasible economic programmes could
satisfy the criterion. On the other hand, if substitution possibilities among capital assets are severely
limited and technological advances are unlikely to occur, it could be that there is no sustainable
economic programme open to an economy. Furthermore, even if the government were bent on
optimising social welfare, the chosen programme would not correspond to a sustainable path if the
utility discount rate, *, were too high. It could also be that along an optimum path social welfare
declines for a period and then increases thereafter, in which case the optimum programme does not
correspond to a sustainable path locally, but does so in the long run.
10
Optimality and sustainability are thus different notions. The concept of sustainability helps
us to better understand the character of economic programmes, and is particularly useful for judging
the performance of imperfect economies.     
11 Pearce and Atkinson (1993) noted this result for optimizing economies.
10
We may now state
Theorem 1 dVt/dt = EipitdKit/dt + MVt/Mt.( 8 )
The proof follows directly from equations (5) and (6).
Definition 6 The accounting value of the rate of change in the stocks of capital assets is
called genuine investment.
If " is autonomous, then MVt/Mt = 0, and so, from equation (8) we have,
Theorem 2 If " is autonomous, then dVt/dt = EipitdKit/dt.
11 (9)
Equation (9) states that at each date the rate of change in social welfare equals genuine
investment. Theorem 2 gives a local measure of sustainability. Integrating (9) yields a non-local
measure:
Theorem 3 If " is autonomous, then, for all T $ 0,
VT - V0 = Ei[piTKiT - pi0Ki0] - 0*
T[Ei(dpiJ/dJ)KiJ]dJ. (10)
Equation (10) shows that in assessing whether or not social welfare has increased between
two dates, the "capital gains" on the assets that have accrued over the interval should be deducted
from the difference in wealth between the dates.
Each of Theorems 1, 2 and 3 is an equivalence result. None says whether " gives rise to an
economic programme along which social welfare is sustained. For example, it can be that an
economy is incapable of achieving a sustainable development path, owing to scarcity of resources,
limited substitution possibilities among capital assets, or whatever. Or it can be that although the
economy is in principle capable of achieving a sustainable development path, social welfare is
unsustainable along the path that has been forecast because of bad government policies. Or it can
be that " is optimal, but that because the chosen utility discount rate is large, social welfare is not
sustained along the optimum economic programme. Or it can be that along an optimum path social
welfare declines for a period and then increases thereafter.
2.4 What Else Does Genuine Investment Measure?
Genuine investment is related to changes in future consumption brought about by it.
Imagine that the capital base at t is not Kt but Kt+)Kt, where as before, ) is an operator signifying
a small difference. In the obvious notation,
V(", Kt+)Kt) - V(", Kt) . t*4UN(CJ))(CJ)exp(-*(J-t))dJ. (11)
Now suppose that at t there is a small change in ", but only for a brief moment, )t, after which the
resource allocation mechanism reverts back to ". We write the increment in the capital base at t+)t
consequent upon the brief increase in genuine investment as )Kt. So )Kt is the consequence of an
increase in genuine investment at t and (Kt+)t+)Kt) is the resulting capital base at t+)t. Let )t tend
to zero. From equation (11) we obtain
Theorem 4 Genuine investment measures the present discounted value of the changes     
12 Theorem 4 is, of course, familiar for economies where the government maximises social
welfare (see e.g., Arrow and Kurz, 1970).
     
13 If the project has been designed efficiently, we would have:
)Yt = (MF/MK)MKt + (MF/ML))Lt + (MF/MR))Rt,
where F is an aggregate production function (Y = F(K,L,R)). The analysis that follows in the text
does not require the project to have been designed efficiently. As we are imagining that aggregate
labour supply is fixed, )Lt used in the project would be the same amount of labour displaced from
elsewhere.
     
14 Dasgupta, Marglin, and Sen (1972) and Little and Mirrlees (1974), respectively, developed
their accounts of social cost-benefit analysis with consumption and government income as
11
to consumption services brought about by it.
12
2.5 Project Evaluation Criteria
Theorem 4 provides a criterion for social cost-benefit analysis of policy reforms. Imagine
that even though the government does not optimize, it can bring about small changes to the
economy by altering the existing resource allocation mechanism in minor ways. The perturbation
in question could be small adjustments to the prevailing structure of taxes for a short while, or it
could be minor alterations to the existing set of property rights for a brief period, or it could be a
small public investment project. Call any such perturbation a "policy reform".
Consider as an example an investment project. It can be viewed as a perturbation to the
resource allocation mechanism " for a brief period (the lifetime of the project), after which the
mechanism reverts back to its earlier form. We consider projects that are small relative to the size
of the economy. How should they be evaluated?
For simplicity of exposition, we suppose there is a single manufactured capital good (K) and
a single extractive natural resource (S). The aggregate rate of extraction is denoted by R. Let the
project's lifetime be the period [0, T]. Denote the project's output and inputs at t by the vector ()Yt,
)Lt, )Kt, )Rt). We imagine that if the project is accepted, the project manager would rent )Kt at
t for the period t to t+)t.
13
The project's acceptance would perturb consumption under ". Let the perturbation at t ($
0) be    # )Ct. It would affect Ut by the amount UN(Ct)   # )Ct. However, because the perturbation includes
all "general equilibrium effects", it would be tiresome if the project evaluator were required to
estimate   # )Ct for every project that came up for consideration. Accounting prices are useful because
they enable project evaluators to estimate    # )Ct indirectly, which means that they do not have to go
beyond project data in order to evaluate projects. Now, it is most unlikely that consumption and
investment have the same accounting price in an imperfect economy. So we divide )Yt into two
parts: changes in consumption and in investment in manufactured capital. Denote them as )Ct and
)(dK/dt), respectively.
U is the unit of account.
14 Let wt denote the accounting wage rate. Next, let qt be thenumeraire. Which numeraire one chooses is, ultimately, not a matter of principle, but one of
practical convenience.
     
15 Thus
qt = t*4UN(CJ)MCJ/MRJexp(-*(J-t))dJ.
Notice that if manufactured capital were to depreciate at a constant rate, say (, the social cost of
borrowing capital would be 8t = * + ( - (dpt/dt)/pt.
Let   $ qt be the accounting price of the resource in situ. At a full-optimum, ptMF/MRt = qt =   $ qt,
and UN(Ct) = pt.
     
16 To prove (16) notice that, by definition, Dt satisfies the equation
12
accounting price of the extractive resource input of the project and 8t the social cost of borrowing
capital (i.e., 8t = * - [dpt/dt]/pt).
15
From the definition of accounting prices, it follows that:
0*4UN(CJ)   # )CJexp(-*J)dJ =
0*
T(UN(CJ))CJ+pJ)(dKJ/dJ)-wJ)LJ-8JpJ)KJ-qJ)RJ)exp(-*J)dJ. (12)
But the RHS of (12) is the present discounted value of social profits from the project (in utility
numeraire). Moreover, 0*4UN(CJ)   # )CJexp(-*J)dJ = )V0, the latter being the change in social
welfare if the project were accepted. We may therefore write (12) as,
)V0 = 0*
T(UN(CJ))CJ+pJ)(dKJ/dJ)-wJ)LJ-8JpJ)KJ-  $ qJ)RJ)exp(-*J)dJ. (13)
Equation (13) leads to the well-known criterion for project evaluation:
Theorem 5 A project should be accepted if and only if the present discounted value of
its social profits is positive.
2.6 Numeraire
So far we have taken utility to be the unit of account. In applied welfare economics,
however, it has been found useful to express benefits and costs in terms of current consumption.
It will pay to review the way the theory being developed here can be recast in consumption
numeraire. For simplicity of exposition, assume that there is a single commodity, that is, an all-
purpose durable good that can be consumed or reinvested for its own accumulation. Assume too
that the elasticity of marginal utility is a constant, 0. Define   6 pt to be the accounting price of the
asset at t in terms of consumption at t; that is,
  6 pt = pt/UN(Ct).  (14)
It follows from (14) that,
(d  6 pt/dt)/  6 pt = (dpt/dt)/pt + 0(dCt/dt)/Ct. (15)
Let Dt be the social rate of discount in consumption numeraire. Dt is sometimes referred to as the
consumption rate of interest (Little and Mirrlees, 1974). From (1),
Dt = * + 0(dCt/dt)/Ct.
16 (16)UN(Ct)exp(-*t) = UN(C0)exp(-0I
tDJ)dJ.
If we differentiate both sides of the above equation with respect to t, (16) follows.
     
17 Notice that in imperfect economies * and 0 may be unobservable. See Section 2.2.  
     
18 Person-specific factors (e.g., age, health status, gender) can be included in the welfare
function. This is routinely done in applied economics.
13
Using (16) in (15) we obtain the relationship between the asset's prices in the two units of account:
(d  6 pt/dt)/  6 pt = (dpt/dt)/pt + Dt - *.
17 (17)
2.7 Intragenerational distribution
The distribution of well-being within a generation has been ignored so far. Theoretically it
is not difficult to include this. If there are N people in each generation and person j consumes Cj,
her welfare would be U(Cj).
18 A simple way to express intragenerational welfare would be to
"concavify" U. Let G be a strictly concave, increasing function of real numbers. We may then
express intragenerational welfare as Ej(G(U(Cj))). Some people would be well-off, others badly-off.
The formulation ensures that at the margin, the well-being of someone who is badly off is awarded
greater weight than that of someone well-off.
The social worth of consumption services (C) depends on who gets what. To accommodate
this idea, we have to enlarge the set of commodities so as to distinguish, at the margin, a good
consumed or supplied by one person from that same good consumed or supplied by another. Thus,
a piece of clothing worn by a poor person should be regarded as a different commodity from that
same type of clothing worn by someone who is rich. With this re-interpretation of goods and
services, the results we have obtained continue to hold.
3 Illustration, 1: a convex production economy
It will prove useful to illustrate the theory by means of a simple example, based on Ramsey
(1928) and Solow (1956). As in Section 2.6, imagine that there is an all-purpose durable good,
whose stock at t is Kt ($ 0). The good can be consumed or reinvested for its own accumulation.
There are no other assets. Write output (GNP) as Y. Technology is linear. So Y = :K, where : >
0. : is the output-wealth ratio. GNP at t is Yt = :Kt.
Imagine that a constant proportion of GNP is saved at each moment. There is no
presumption though that the saving rate is optimum; rather, it is a behavioural characteristic of
consumers, reflecting their response to an imperfect credit market. Other than this imperfection, the
economy is assumed to function well. At each moment expectations are fulfilled and all markets
other than the credit market clear. This defines the resource allocation mechanism, ". Clearly, "
is autonomous in time. We now characterise " explicitly.
Let the saving ratio be s (0 < s < 1). Write aggregate consumption as Ct. Therefore,
Ct = (1-s)Yt = (1-s):Kt. (18)
Capital is assumed to depreciate at a constant rate ( (> 0). Genuine investment is therefore,     
19 These are not fanciful figures. Per capita consumption in a number of countries in sub-Saharan
Africa declined over the past three decades at as high a rate as 1 percent per year, implying that for
small values of *, the consumption rate of interest would have been negative.
     
20 As the economy has a single asset, Theorem 3 is trivially true.
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dKt/dt = (s:-()Kt. (19)
K0 is the initial capital stock. The economy grows if s: > (, and shrinks if s: < (. To obtain a feel
for orders of magnitude, suppose ( = 0.05 and : = 0.25. The economy grows if s > 0.2, and shrinks
if s < 0.2.
Integrating (19), we obtain,
KJ = Ktexp[(s:-()(J-t)], for all J and t,  J$t$0, (20)
from which it follows that,
CJ = (1-s):KJ = (1-s):Ktexp[(s:-()(J-t)], for all J and t, J$t$0. (21)
If the capital stock was chosen as numeraire, wealth would be Kt, and NNP would be (:-
()Kt. Each of wealth, GNP, NNP, consumption and genuine investment expands at the exponential
rate (s: - () if s: > (; they all contract at the exponential rate (( - s:) if s: < (. We have
introduced capital depreciation into the example so as to provide a whiff (albeit an artificial whiff)
of a key idea, that even if consumption is less than GNP, wealth declines when genuine investment
is negative. Wealth declines when consumption exceeds NNP.
Current utility is U(Ct). Consider the form
U(C) = -C
-(0-1), where  0 > 1. (22)
0 is the elasticity of marginal utility and * is the social rate of discount if utility is numeraire. Let
Dt be the social rate of discount if consumption is the unit of account. It follows that
Dt = * + 0(dCt/dt)/Ct = * + 0(s: - (). (23)
The sign of Dt depends upon the resource allocation mechanism ". In particular, Dt can be negative.
To see why, suppose the unit of time is a year, * = 0.03, ( = 0.04, s = 0.10, 0 = 2, and : = 0.20.
Then 0[dCt/dt]/Ct = -0.04 per year, and (23) says that Dt = -0.01 per year.
19
Social welfare at t is,
Vt = t*4U(CJ)exp(-*(J-t))dJ. (24)




or, assuming that [(0-1)(s:-()+*] > 0,
Vt = -[(1-s):Kt]
-(0-1)/[(0-1)(s:-()+*]. (25)
V is differentiable in K everywhere. Moreover, MVt/Mt =0. Equations (20) and (25) confirm Theorem
1.
20
We turn now to accounting prices.
(i) Utility Numeraire
Begin by taking utility to be numeraire. Let pt be the accounting price of capital. Now     
21 A special case of formula (32) appears in Dasgupta, Marglin, and Sen (1972). However, unlike
our present work, the earlier publication did not provide a rigorous welfare economic theory for
imperfect economies. 
     
22 Solow (1974) and Hartwick (1977) are the key articles on this limiting case.
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pt / MVt/MKt = t*4UN(CJ)[MCJ/MKt]exp(-*(J-t))dJ. (26)




Using equations (20), (21), (25), and (27) it is simple to check that pt … UN(Ct), except when
s = (:+(0-1)(-*)/:0. Let s* be the optimum saving rate. From equation (25) we have,
s* = (:+(0-1)(-*)/:0. (28)
Note that pt < UN(Ct) if s > s*, which means there is excessive saving. Conversely, pt >
UN(Ct) if s < s*, which means there is excessive consumption.
(ii) Consumption Numeraire
Write   6 pt = pt/UN(Ct). (29)
Using (26) in (29) yields
  6 pt = t*4[UN(CJ)/UN(Ct)][MCJ/MKt]exp(-*(J-t))dJ. (30)
Now use (21), (22) and (30) to obtain
  6 pt = t*4(1-s):exp[(-D+(s:-())(J-t)]dJ, (31)
where D = * + 0(s:-().
From (31) we have
  6 pt = (1-s):/[D-(s:-()]. (32)
Observe that   6 pt > 1 (resp. < 1) if s < s* (resp. > s*).
21
In order to obtain a sense of orders of magnitude, suppose 0 = 2, : = 0.20, ( = 0.05, and
* = 0. From (28) we have s* = 0.625. Now imagine that s = 0.40 (by Ramsey's criterion, this is
undersaving!). Using (23) we have D = 0.06 per unit of time. So (32) reduces to   6 pt = 4. In other
words, a saving rate that is approximately 30 percent short of the optimum corresponds to a high
figure for the accounting price of investment: investment should be valued four times consumption.
Although intergenerational equity is nearly always discussed in terms of the rate at which
future well-being is discounted (see, e.g., Portney and Bryant, 1998), equity would be more
appropriately discussed in terms of the curvature of U. Let the unit of time be a year. Suppose (
= 0, * = 0.02, and : = 0.32. Consider two alternative values of 0: 25 and 50. It is simple to confirm
that s* = 0.038 if 0 = 25 and s* = 0.019 if 0 = 50. Intergenerational equity in both consumption and
welfare (the latter is a concave function of the former) can be increased indefinitely by making 0
larger and larger: Ct becomes "flatter" as 0 is increased. In the limit, as 0 goes to infinity, s* tends
to ( (equation (28)), which reflects the Rawlsian maxi-min consumption as applied to the
intergenerational context.
22
4 Illustration, 2: a non-convex ecosystem     
23 For the ecology of shallow lakes, see Scheffer (1997) and Carpenter, Ludwig, and Brock
(1999).
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The Ramsey-Solow economy discussed above is convex. In this section we confirm that the
theory presented in Section 2 can be applied to non-convex economies. We do this by studying a
model of shallow lakes.
23
A key determinant of the overall state of a shallow lake is phosphorus, which is a necessary
nutrient for such ecological services in the lake as those that provide a habitat for fish populations.
But at high levels of concentration phosphorus is a pollutant, causing as it does increased plant
growth, algae blooms, decrease in water transparency, bad odour, oxygen depletion, and fish kills.
Thus, the state of a lake can be taken to be the quantity of phosphorus in the water column, which
we denote by a scalar, S.
The rate of phosphorus inflow into a lake is a byproduct of agriculture in the watershed
(e.g., as fertilizer runoff from farms). We bring these considerations together and postulate that
current utility is a strictly concave and differential function U(C,S), where U is an increasing
function of phosphorus inflow, C. Imagine next that phosphorus has a deletarious effect on the lake
at all levels of concentration (and not just at high levels of concentration); which is to say that U
is a decreasing function of S for all S. This assumption brings into sharp relief those economic
problems where a produced good has positive social worth as a flow, even though it is a pollutant
as a stock.
Social welfare at t is
V(St) = t*4U(CJ,SJ)exp(-*(J-t))dJ, where US < 0 and UC > 0. (33)
4.1 Constant Phosphorus Inflow
Consider the case where the resource allocation mechanism for phosphorus inflow is such
that Ct is a constant, say   6 C. Studies have confirmed that there is a feedback of phosphorus from
bottom sediments when the density of algae in the lake is large. This feedback is reflected in the
form of recycling - from sediment to the water column. Experiments suggest that the recycling rate,
R, is a sigmoid function of S. A simple form of the relationship is,
Rt = bSt
2/(1 + St
2), where b > 0. (34)
The rate of input of phosphorus into the water column is therefore [  6 C + bSt
2/(1 + St
2)].
However, phosphorus is depleted from the water column owing to sedimentation and water
outflow. Assuming that the rate of loss is proportional to S, say (S (( > 0), the phosphorus content
in the lake's water column is governed by the equation,
dSt/dt =   6 C + bSt
2/(1 + St
2) - (St. (35)
For a range of parameter values   6 C, b, and (, the curves [  6 C + bS
2/(1 + S
2)] and (S intersect at three
points. This is shown in Fig. 1. The upper and lower intersects, S3 and S1, are stable stationary
points of (35), whereas the intermediate intersect, S2, is unstable. Thus, S2 is the unique separatrix
of the dynamical system. S3 and S1 should be thought of as eutrophic and oligotrophic states,     
24 Note too that because the resource allocation mechanism is imperfect, -UC … MV/MS (see
Section 4.2 below).
     
25 Although, for ease of exposition, we are using the same notation, the points S1, S2, and S3 here
are not the same as the points S1, S2, and S3 in the previous sub-section.
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respectively. On using (35), the resource allocation mechanism, ", governing the lake's quality can
be expressed as,
dSJ/dJ =   6 C + bSJ
2/(1 + SJ
2) - (SJ, for J $ t, for all t, where S0 is an initial condition. (36)
Clearly, " is autonomous and time consistent. It is simple to confirm that V(S) is
differentiable in S everywhere, excepting S2. It is simple to confirm as well that, although V(S) is
discontinuous at S2, it possesses both right- and left-hand derivatives there. We can therefore define
the accounting price of the lake's quality to be p(S) = MV/MS at all S … S2 and apply the theory
locally for the purposes of project evaluation and sustainability assessment. It should be noted that
because phosphorus is a pollutant in the lake, p(S) < 0.
24
4.2 Optimum Phosphorus Inflow
The resource allocation mechanism defined by (36) reflects an imperfect economy. Brock
and Starrett (2003) have studied the optimum resource allocation mechanism. To review their work,
we generalize (36). If Ct is the inflow of phosphorus, the lake's dynamics are given by the equation,
dSt/dt = Ct + bSt
2/(1 + St
2) - (St, for t $ 0, (37)
where S0 is given as an initial condition.
The problem is to choose {Ct}0
4 so as to maximize (33), subject to (37).
Clearly, the optimum resource allocation mechanism is both autonomous and time
consistent. In what follows, we restrict ourselves to the case where the optimum is an interior one
(i.e. Ct > 0). Let pt be the accounting price of phosphorus in the lake. Brock and Starrett confirmed
that, for {Ct}0
4 to be an optimum, it is necessary that Ct and St satisfy not only (37), but also the
Pontryagin conditions,
pt = -UC (< 0), for all t, (38)
and (dpt/dt)/pt = * + ( - US/UC - 2bSt/(1+St
2)
2, for all t. (39)
The point therefore is to select p0 (equivalently, C0) optimally and allow the dynamical
system to evolve in accordance with equations (37)-(39). The authors showed that, in the (p, S)
space, equations (37)-(39) can have at most a countable number of stationary points. They studied
in detail the class of parameter values for which the number of stationary points is three. They
found that two of them (call them S1 and S3, with S1 < S3, corresponding to what could be
interpreted to be the oligotrophic and eutrophic state, respectively) are saddle points, while the
intermediate point (call it S2) is a spiral source (i.e., it is unstable).
25 The authors showed that there
exists a value of phosphorus stock,   6 S, such that if S0 >   6 S, the optimum programme asymptotes to     
26 To the best of our knowledge, Kurz (1968) was the first to note that if utility depends directly
on capital stocks, the optimality conditions may possess multiple stationary points. Skiba (1978)
showed that in non-convex economies the optimality conditions may possess multiple stationary
points even if the utility function is independent of stocks. The model of Brock and Starrett (2003)
combines the two features.
     
27 Brock and Starrett (2003) refer to   6 S as a Skiba point, the reference being to Skiba (1978).
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S3; but if S0 <   6 S, it asymptotes to S1. In short, history matters.
26 It is easy to confirm that if, by fluke,
S0 =   6 S, there are two equally desirable optimal programmes, one that asymptotes to S1, another that
asymptotes to S3. This last property can be shown to imply that V(S), although not differentiable at
  6 S, is continuous at   6 S and possesses both left- and right-derivatives.   6 S is an endogenously
determined separatrix.
27
Since the optimum resource allocation mechanism is autonomous, we may write by p(S)
the optimum policy function. Phosphorus being a pollutant in the lake, we have p(S) < 0. It can be
shown that p(S) is differentiable everywhere excepting at   6 S. It can also be demonstrated that p(S)
is discontinuous at   6 S, but is left- and right-differentiable there. Moreover,
p(S) = MV/MS (< 0), for all S …   6 S. (40)
Writing by [p(S)]  6 S-0 (resp., [p(S)]  6 S+0) the limit of p(S) as S tends to   6 S from the left (resp., right), and
similarly for [MV/MS]  6 S-0 and [MV/MS]  6 S+0, it can be shown too that [p(S)]  6 S-0 = [MV/MS]  6 S-0 and [p(S)]  6 S+0
= [MV/MS]  6 S+0. The theory we have outlined in Section 2 is thus applicable to the optimum resource
allocation mechanism of this particular non-convex economy.
Having illustrated the theory by means of a three examples, we now proceed to obtain rules
for estimating accounting prices. We do this by focussing on specific categories of capital assets
and several well known institutional imperfections.
5 Exhaustible Resources: the closed economy
Accounting prices of exhaustible resources when depletion rates are optimal have been
much studied (e.g., Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; see below). What is the structure of their accounting
prices when resources are instead common pools?
Two property-rights regimes suggest themselves: open access and restricted entry. They in
turn need to be compared to an optimum regime. It is simplest if we avoid a complete capital model.
So we resort to a partial equilibrium world: income effects are assumed to be negligible. Let Rt be
the quantity extracted at t. Income is the numeraire. Let U(R) be the area under the demand curve
below R. So UN(R) is taken to be the market demand function. U is assumed to be an increasing and
strictly concave function of R for positive values of R. In order to have a notation that is consistent
with the one in the foregoing example, we take the social rate of interest to be an exogenously given
constant, D. Let St be the stock. Then,
dSt/dt = -Rt. (41)
5.1 The Optimum Regime     
28 McKelvey (1980) has studied a special case of the model of diffusion developed below.
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In order to construct a benchmark against which imperfect economies can be evaluated, we
first study an optimizing economy. Assume that extraction is costless (constant unit extraction cost
can be introduced easily). Social welfare at t is,
Vt = t*4U(RJ)exp(-D(J-t))dJ. (42)
Let pt* denote the accounting price of the resource underground (equivalently, the Hotelling rent,
or the optimum depletion charge per unit extracted). We know that
dpt*/dt = Dpt*. (43)
This is the Hotelling Rule. Moreover, optimum extraction, Rt*, must satisfy the condition,
UN(Rt) = pt*. (44)
Assume that
U(R) = -R
-(0-1), where  0 > 1. (45)
Then
Rt* = (D/0)S0exp(-Dt/0). (46)
We next consider the two imperfect regimes.
5.2 Restricted Entry
For vividness, assume that there are N identical farmers (i, j = 1,2,...,N), drawing from an
unrechargeable aquifer. Extraction is costless. We model the situation in the following way:
28
At t, farmer i owns a pool of size Sit. Each pool is separated from every other pool by a
porous barrier. Water percolates from the pool which is larger to the one which is smaller. Let 8ij
(> 0), be the rate at which water diffuses from pool i to pool j. We assume that 8ij = 8ji. Denote by
Rit the rate at which i draws from his pool. There are then N depletion equations:
dSit/dt = EN-i[8ji(Sjt - Sit)] - Rit, (47)
where "EN-i" denotes summation over all j other than i.
The payoff function for farmer i at time t is
t*4U(RiJ)exp(-D(J-t))dJ. (48)
Farmers play non-cooperatively. For tractablity, we study an open loop solution: Farmers
are assumed to be naive (when computing his own optimum extraction rates, each takes the others'
extraction rates as given).
Let pit be the (spot) personal accounting price of a unit of i's own resource pool. The present
value Hamiltonian for i's optimization problem would then be,
Ht = U(Rit)exp(-Dt) + [EN-i8ji(Sjt - Sit) - Rit]pitexp(-Dt). (49)
It follows from (49) that pit obeys the equation,
dpit/dt = (D + EN-i8ji)pit. (50)
For notational simplicity, assume that 8ij = 8 for all i, j. Then (50) reduces to
dpit/dt = (D + (N-1)8)pit. (51)     
29 In the limit, as 8 tends to infinity, $ tends to infinity, implying that depletion is instantaneous.
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Write [D + (N-1)8] = $. We conclude that the rush to extract because of insecure property rights
amounts to each extractor using an implicit discount rate, $, which is in excess of the social
discount rate D.
29
Assume now that the elasticity of demand is a constant, 0 (> 1). Using (46) and (51), we conclude
that the extraction rate from the common pool is
RJ = ($/0)Stexp(-$(J-t)/0)), for all J $ t. (52)
In order to have a meaningful problem, we take it that $/0 > $-D (see below).
Let pt be the resource's (social) accounting price. We know
that pt = MVt/MSt. Using (46), it follows that,
pt = t*4UN(RJ)[MRJ/MSt]exp(-D(J-t))dJ. (53)
Write   6 pt = pt/UN(Rt). Then (51) and (53) imply
  6 pt = $/($ - 0($-D)) > 1. (54)
(Notice that   6 pt = 1 if $ = D.)
As a numerical illustration, consider the case where D = 0.06, $ = 0.10, and 0 = 2. In this
case,   6 pt = 5, which reflects a considerable imperfection in the resource allocation mechanism in
question: the resource's accounting price is five times its market price.
5.3 Open Access
We next study an open-access pool. To have a meaningful problem, we now assume that
extraction is costly. For simplicity, let the unit extraction cost be a constant k (> 0). Under open
access, Hotelling rents are dissipated completely. Therefore, the equilibrium extraction rate, Rt, is
the solution of the equation,
UN(Rt) = k. (55)
Equation (55) confirms that, for any given level of reserves, there is excessive extraction. Let   6 R be
the solution of (55). We then have,
dSt/dt = -  6 R.
Reserves remain positive for a period T = S/  6 R. Let us normalize utility by setting U(0) = 0. It
follows that,
Vt = t*
(t+S(t)/   6 R)(U(  6 R) - k  6 R)exp(-D(J-t))dJ. (56)
Let pt be the accounting price of the unextracted resource. Then,
pt = MVt/MSt = [(U(  6 R) - k  6 R)/  6 R]exp(-DSt/  6 R) > 0. (57)
Write   6 pt = pt/UN(  6 R), which is the ratio of the resource's shadow price to its unit extraction cost.
Then, from (55) and (57),
  6 pt = [(U(  6 R) - k  6 R)/k  6 R]exp(-DSt/  6 R) > 0. (58)     
30 See also Hartwick and Hageman (1993) for a fine discussion that links El Serafy's formula to
Hicks' formulation of the concept of national income (Hicks, 1942).
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(58) resembles a formula proposed by El Serafy (1989) for estimating depletion charges.
30 The
charge is positive because an extra unit of water in the aquifer would extend the period of
extraction. Notice that   6 pt is bounded above by the ratio of the Marshallian consumer surplus to total
extraction cost; furthermore, it increases as the aquifer is depleted and attains its upper bound at the
date at which the pool is exhausted. If reserves are large,   6 pt is small, and free access involves no
great loss - a familiar result.
What are plausible orders of magnitude? Consider the linear demand function. Assume
therefore that
U(R) = aR - bR
2, where a > k and b > 0. (59)
From (55) and (59),
  6 R = (a - k)/2b. (60)
Substituting (59) and (60) in (58),
  6 pt = ((a-k)/2k)exp(-2bDSt/(a-k)). (61)
Equation (61) says that
  6 p $ 1 iff DS # ((a-k)/2b)ln((a-k)/2k).
(61) expresses the magnitude of   6 p in terms of the parameters of the model. Suppose, for example,
that D = 0.02 per year, S/  6 R = 100 years (i.e. at the current rate of extraction, the aquifer will be
exhausted in 100 years), (a-k)/2k = 20 (e.g., k = $0.50 and (a-k) = $20). Then
  6 p = 20exp(-2) . 7. (62)
We should conclude that the value to be attributed to water at the margin is high (about 7 times
extraction cost). As the date of exhaustion gets nearer, the accounting price rises to its upper bound,
20.
6 Exploration and Discoveries
How should one account for expenditure on explorations of new deposits of exhaustible
resources? We imagine that the rate at which new reserves are discovered, N, is an increasing
function of (1) current expenditure on explorations, E, and (2) the accumulated expenditure on
explorations, M, but is a declining function of (3) accumulated extraction, Zt. Denote the discovery
function be N(Et,Mt,Zt), where
dMt/dt = Et, (63)
and dZt/dt = Rt. (64)
We revert to the model containing one manufactured capital good, K, and an exhaustible natural
resource, S. In the familiar notation, Y = F(K, R) is taken to be the aggregate production function.
The remaining equations of motion are,
dKt/dt = F(Kt, Rt) - Ct - Et. (65)
dSt/dt = N(Et,Mt,Zt) - Rt. (66)     
31 That the industry optimizes does not mean that the economy is following an optimum
programme.
     
32 It should be noted though that the value of urban land would be more than just the new
investment: there is a contribution to the value (which could be of either sign) arising from changes
in population density - both in the newly developed property and in places of origin of those who
migrate to the property.
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The model has four capital assets K, S, M, and Z. Their accounting prices are denoted by pK, pS, pM,
and pZ, respectively. Social welfare is given by (1). From Theorem 1, we have
dVt/dt = pK[F(Kt,Rt)-Ct-Et] + pS[N(Et,Mt,Zt)-Rt] + pMEt + pZRt. (67)
There are two cases to consider:
(A) Assume that MN/MM = 0 (implying that pM=0) and MN/MZ < 0 (implying that pZt < 0).
Even in this case genuine investment is not the sum of investment in manufactured capital and
changes in proven reserves (Nt-Rt). This is because new reserves are valued differently from
existing reserves. Note too that exploration costs should not be regarded as investment.
Consider now the special case where the mining industry optimizes.
31 Then pK = pSMN/ME.
If, in addition, pSNt can be approximated by pKEt, one could exclude discoveries of new reserves
from genuine investment, but regard instead exploration costs as part of that investment.
(B) Suppose MN/MM > 0. If the industry optimizes, we have
pK = pM + pSMN/ME, (68)
and so pK > pM. It follows that genuine investment should now include not only new discoveries and
investment in manufactured capital (as in Case A), but also exploration costs, using an accounting
price that is less than that of manufactured capital.
7 Forests and Trees
As stocks, forests offer a multitude of services. Here we focus on forests as a source of
timber. Hamilton and Clemens (1999) regard the accounting value of forest depletion to be the
stumpage value (price minus logging costs) of the quantity of commercial timber and fuelwood
harvested in excess of natural regeneration rates. This is an awkward move, since the authors do
not say what is intended to happen to the land being deforested. For example, if the deforested land
is converted into an urban sprawl, the new investment in the sprawl would be recorded in
conventional accounting statistics.
32 But if it is intended to be transformed into farmland, matters
would be different: the social worth of the land as a farm should be included as an addition to the
economy's stock of capital assets. In what follows, we consider the simple case where the area is
predicted to remain a forest.
Let the price of timber, in consumption numeraire, be unity and let D (assumed constant)
be the social rate of discount. Holding all other assets constant, if Bt is aggregate forest land at, we
may express social welfare as V(Bt). The accounting price of forest land is then MVt/MBt, which we
write as st.23
Consider a unit of land capable of supporting a single tree and its possible successors. If the
land is virgin, if a seed is planted at t=0, if F(T) is the timber yield of a tree aged T, and if T is the
rotation cycle, then the present discounted value of the land as a tree-bearer is,
s0 =  F(T)exp(-DT)/(1-exp(-DT)). (69)
Suppose instead that at t=0 the piece of land in question houses a tree aged J. What is the value of
the land?
If the cycle is expected to be maintained, we have
s0 = F(T)exp(-D(T-J))/[1-exp(-D(T-J))]. (70)
If instead the tree is logged now, but the cycle is expected to be maintained, the value of the land,
after the tree has been felled, is given by (69). Depreciation of the forest, as a capital asset, is the
difference between (70) and (69).
8 Human Capital
To develop an accounting framework for knowledge acquisition and skill formation,
consider a modified version of the basic model of Section 2. In particular, the underlying resource
allocation mechanism is assumed to be autonomous. Labour hours are assumed to be supplied
inelastically and population is constant, we may as well then normalize by regarding the labour-
hours supplied to be unity.
Production of the consumption good involves physical capital, K1t, and human capital, H1t.
Here, H1t is to be interpreted to be the human capital embodied in those who work in the sector
producing the consumption good. Thus, if Yt is output of the consumption good,
Yt = F(K1t, H1t), (71)
where F is an increasing function of its arguments.
Assume that human capital is produced with the help of physical capital, K2t, and human
capital, H2t, and that, owing to mortality, it depreciates at a constant rate, (. Output of human
capital is given by the technology
G(K2t, H2t), (72)
where G is an increasing function of its arguments and strictly concave, representing that the input
of students is given.
By assumption, all individuals at a given moment of time have the same amount of human
capital. Therefore, H1t/(H1t+H2t) is the proportion of people employed in the sector producing the
consumption good. Let the total quantity of human capital be H. It follows that
H1t + H2t = Ht. (73)
Write
K1t + K2t = Kt. (74)
For simplicity of exposition, we assume that physical capital does not depreciate. Accumulation of
physical capital can be expressed as
dKt/dt = F(K1t, H1t) - Ct, (75)24
and the accumulation of human capital as
dHt/dt = G(K2t, H2t) - (Ht. (76)
Since the resource allocation mechanism, ", is assumed to be autonomous, we have
Vt = V(", K1t, K2t, H1t, H2t). (77)
Let p1t and p2t be the accounting prices of physical capital and q1t and q2t the accounting
prices of human capital, in the two sectors, respectively (i.e., p1t = MVt/MK1t, q2t = MVt/MH2t, and so
forth). Therefore, wealth can be expressed as,
Zt = p1tK1t + p2tK2t + q1tH1t + q2tH2t,
and genuine investment by
It = p1tdK1t/dt + p2tdK2t/dt + q1tdH1t/dt + q2tdH2t/dt. (78)
If " were an optimum resource allocation mechanism, we would have p1t = p2t = pt, say,
and q1t = q2t = qt, say. These prices would be related by the optimality conditions
UN(Ct) = pt; ptMF/MK1 = qtMG/MK2;
and ptMF/MH1 = qtMG/MH2.
Estimating q1t and q2t poses difficult problems in practice. It has been customary to identify
human capital with education and to estimate its accounting price in terms of the market return on
education (i.e., salaries over and above raw labour). But this supposes, as we have assumed in the
above model, that education offers no direct utility. If education does offer direct utility (and it is
widely acknowledged to do so), the market return on education is an underestimate of what we
should ideally be after. Furthermore, human capital includes health, which too is both a durable
consumption good and capital good.
An alternative is to use estimates of expenditures on health and education for the purpose
in hand. Such a procedure may be be a reasonable approximation for poor societies, but it is in all
probability far off the mark for rich societies.
9 Global Public Goods
Countries interact with one another not only through trade in international markets, but also
via transnational externalities. Hamilton and Clemens (1999) include carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere in their list of assets and regard the accounting price (a negative number) of a country's
emission to be the amount it would be required to pay the rest of the world if carbon emissions were
the outcome of a fully cooperative agreement. Their procedure is, consequently, valid only if each
country is engaged in maximising global welfare, an unusual scenario. In what follows, we develop
the required analysis.
Let Gt be the stock of a global common at t. We imagine that G is measured in terms of a
"quality" index which, to fix ideas, we shall regard as carbon dioxide concentration in the
atmosphere. Being a global common, G is an argument in the value function V of every country.
For simplicity of notation, we assume that there is a single private capital good. Let Kjt be the stock
of the private asset owned by citizens of country j and let "j be j's (autonomous) resource allocation     
33 Social cost-benefit analysis, as sketched in Section 2.4, would enable a country to estimate
whether it ought to alter its emissions. Nordhaus and Yang (1996) have studied international carbon
emissions as the outcome of a non-cooperative equilibrium game among nations.   
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mechanism and " the vector of resource allocation mechanisms. If Vj is j's value function, we have
Vjt = Vj(", Kjt, Gt). (79)
Let pjt = MVjt/MKjt and gjt = MVjt/MGt. It may be that G is an economic "good" for some countries,
while it is an economic "bad" for others. For the former, gj > 0; for the latter, gj < 0. Let Ekt be the
emission rate from country k and let ( be the rate at which carbon in the atmosphere is sequestered.
It follows that
dGt/dt = EkEkt - (Gt. (80)
Genuine investment in j is,
It = dVjt/dt = pjtdKjt/dt + gjtdGt/dt,
which, on using (80), can be expressed as
It = pjtdKjt/dt + gjt(EkEkt - (Gt). (81)
Notice that the expression on the RHS of (81) is the same whether or not " is based on international
cooperation. On the other hand, dKjt/dt and dGt/dt do depend on how the international resource
allocation mechanisms are arrived at (e.g., whether they are cooperative or non-cooperative); and
they affect the accounting prices, pjt and gjt.
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10 Exogenous Productivity Growth
To assume exogenous growth in total factor productivity (the residual) over the indefinite
future is imprudent. It is hard to believe that serendipity, unbacked by R&D effort and investment,
can be a continual source of productivity growth. Moreover, many environmental resources go
unrecorded in growth accounting. If the use of natural capital in an economy has in fact been
increasing, estimates of the residual could be presumed to be biased upward. On the other hand, if
a poor country were able to make free use of the R&D successes of rich countries, it would enjoy
a positive residual.
The residual can have short bursts in imperfect economies. Imagine that a government
reduces economic inefficiencies by improving the enforcement of property rights, or reducing
centralized regulations (import quotas, price controls, and so forth). We would expect the factors
of production to find better uses. As factors realign in a more productive fashion, total factor
productivity would increase.
In the opposite vein, the residual could become negative for a period. Increased government
corruption could be a cause; the cause could also be civil strife, which destroys capital assets and
damages a country's institutions. When institutions deteriorate, assets are used even more
inefficiently than before and the residual declines. This would appear to have happened in sub-
Saharan Africa during the past forty years (Collins and Bosworth, 1996).
We now study sustainability in the context of two models of exogenous productivity growth.26
10.1 Labour-augmenting Technical Progress
Consider an adaptation of the model explored in Section 3. Physical capital and a constant
labour force together produce a non-deteriorating all purpose commodity. The economy enjoys
labour augmenting technological progress at a constant rate n. If K is capital and A is knowledge,
we have in the usual notation,
Yt = F(Kt, At), (82)
dKt/dt = F(Kt, At) - Ct, (83)
and dAt/dt = nAt. (84)
There are two capital goods, K and A. Let pK and pA, respectively, be their accounting prices in
utility numeraire. The sustainability criterion is then pKdKt/dt + pAdAt)/dt $ 0, or, equivalently,
dKt/dt + qtdAt/dt $ 0, where qt / pA/pK. (85)
It is instructive to study the case where the resource allocation mechanism is optimal. The equations
of motion for pK and pA are,
dpK/dt = *pK - pKMF/MK, (86)
and dpA/dt = *pA - pKMF/MA - npA. (87)
Using (85)-(87) yields,
dqt/dt = (MF/MK - n)qt - MF/MA. (88)
Suppose F displays constant returns to scale. Define k = K/A and c = C/A. Write f(k) / F(k, 1).
From (83) and (84) we have
dkt/dt = f(kt) - nkt - ct,
or dkt/dt = (MF/MK)kt + MF/MA - nkt - ct. (89)
Adding (88) and (89) yields
d(qt + kt)/dt = (MF/MK - n)(qt+ kt) - ct. (90)
It is simple to confirm that q+k is the present value of future consumption (discounted at the rate
MF/MK) divided by A (the current state of knowledge). It follows that the sustainability criterion at
t (condition (85)), divided by At, is
dkt/dt + n(kt + qt) $ 0. (91)
10.2 Resource Augmenting Technical Progress
Consider an alternative world, where output, Y, is a function of manufactured capital (K)
and the flow of an exhaustible natural resource (R). Let AtRt be the effective supply of the resource
in production at t and St the resource stock at t. Then we may write,
Yt = F(Kt, AtRt), (92)
dKt/dt = F(Kt, AtRt) - Ct, (93)
dAt/dt = n, (94)
dSt/dt = -Rt. (95)
There are three state variables. But we can reduce the model to one with two state variables. Thus,
write Qt / AtRt and Xt = AtSt. Then (93) and (94) become,27
dKt/dt = F(Kt, Qt) - Ct, (96)
and dXt/dt = nXt - Qt. (97)
This is equivalent to a renewable resource problem, and the steady state is the Green Golden Rule,
with
nX = Q. (98)
Let pK and pX be the accounting prices of Kt and Xt, respectively. Then the sustainability condition
is,
pKdKt/dt + pXdXt/dt $ 0. (99)
It is instructive to study the case where the resource allocation mechanism is optimal.
Suppose also that F displays constant returns to scale. Following the approach of the previous
example, let qt = pX/pK. Then it is easy to confirm that
(dqt/dt)/qt = MF/MK - n. (100)
Moreover, the optimal use of the productivity adjusted natural resource, Qt, is determined by the
condition,
MF/MQ = qt. (101)
Along the optimal programme, the sustainability condition (99) is,
F(Kt, Qt) - Ct + qt(nXt - Qt) $ 0, (102)
or (MF/MK)Kt + (MF/MQ)Qt - Ct + qt(nXt - Qt) $ 0, (103)
or (MF/MK)Kt - Ct + nqtXt $ 0. (104)
Inequality (104) says that consumption must not exceed the sum of capital income and the
sustainable yield.
11 Exhaustible Resources: the exporting economy
The export of natural resources at given world prices raises issues similar to those we have
just encountered in our analysis of exogenous productivity change. The exogenous "drift" term,
MVt/Mt, in equation (8) has to be estimated.
Assume that extraction is costless. Suppose that at time J the world market price of an
exhaustible resource is qJ. If RJ is the volume of export, revenue is qJRJ.
Write CJ = qJRJ. (105)
The country's export policy, being governed by the underlying ", can be expressed as R(J,St,t) for
J $ t. From equation (105) it follows that
dCJ/dt = qJdRJ/dt = (MCJ/MSt)dSt/dt + qJMRJ/Mt, (106)
As before, we assume that social welfare at t is,
Vt = t*4U(CJ)exp(-D(J-t))dJ. (107)
Let pt denote the resource's accounting price. Since the criterion for sustainable well-being is dVt/dt,
we differentiate both sides of equation (107) with respect to t to obtain,
dVt/dt = -U(Ct) + DVt + t*4UN(CJ)[(MCJ/MSt)dSt/dt + qtMRJ/Mt]exp(-D(J-t))dJ. (108)
But     
34 Asheim (1996), Sefton and Weale (1996), Vincent, Panayotou, and Hartwick (1997),
Aronsson and Löfgren (1998), and Cairns (2002) have published related findings, but in the context
of optimising economies.
     
35 In this case the resource will be exhausted in finite time. For notational simplicity, we continue
to present matters as though the horizon is infinite.
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dSt/dt = -Rt.
Therefore, equation (108) reduces to
dVt/dt = -U(Ct) + DVt + ptdSt/dt + t*4UN(CJ)exp(-D(J-t))(MCJ/Mt)dJ. (109)
Define :(J,t) = MCJ/MJ + MCJ/Mt. (110)
:(J,t) can be regarded as an index of the extent to which the resource allocation mechanism is non-
autonomous. Using equations (105)-(107) and (110), the RHS of equation (109) can be reexpressed
as,
dVt/dt = -U(Ct) + DVt + ptdSt/dt + t*4UN(CJ)exp(-D(J-t)):(J,t)dJ - t*4UN(CJ)exp(-D(J-
t))(MCJ/MJ)dJ. (111)
On partially integrating the last term on the RHS of equation (111) and cancelling terms, we obtain,
dVt/dt = ptdSt/dt + t*4UN(CJ)exp(-*(J-t)):(J,t)dJ. (112)
The integral on the RHS of (112) is the "drift" term. As (112) shows, the index of sustainable
welfare is the algebraic sum of genuine investment and the drift term. We now proceed to obtain
simple rules for estimating the index in the case of two special non-optimum resource allocation
mechanisms.
34
Suppose C is constant.
35 In this case,
MCJ/MJ = MCJ/Mt = 0,
and :(J,t) = 0 in (112) is zero, and genuine investment measures changes in social welfare.
Suppose instead R is constant. It follows that
MRJ/MJ + MRJ/Mt = 0, (113)
and :(J,t) = RJMqJ/MJ = qJRJ(MqJ/MJ)/qJ. (114)
Using (113) and (114), we may write,
t*4UN(CJ)exp(-*(J-t)):(J,t)dJ =   6 :t/*, (115)
where   6 :t can be interpreted as the average capital gains on the world market, as viewed from time
t. Formally, (112) can be re-written as,
dVt/dt = ptdSt/dt +   6 :t/*. (116)
12. Defensive Expenditure
How should defensive expenditure toward pollution control appear in national accounts?
Denote by Qt the stock of defensive capital and Xt investment in its accumulation. Let Pt be the
stock of pollutants and Yt aggregate output. We may then write,
dPt/dt = G(Yt, Qt) - BPt, where G(Yt, Qt) $ 0, MG/MY > 0 and MG/MQ < 0. (117)
Moreover, if defensive capital depreciates at the rate >, then     
36 For a discussion of such problems and possible resolutions to the paradoxes that normative
population theory has given rise to, see Dasgupta (2001b).
     
37 If Nt is a logistic function, n(Nt) = A(N*-Nt), where A and N* are positive constants.
     
38 See Dasgupta (2001b) for a justification of this form of intergenerational welfare.
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dQt/dt = Xt - (Qt, where ( > 0. (118)
In the usual notation, the accumulation equation is expressed as,
dKt/dt = F(Kt) - Ct - Xt. (119)
Denote by pt the accounting price of K, mt that of defensive capital, and rt (< 0) the accounting price
of the pollutant. Wealth can then be expressed as,
ptKt + mtQt + rtPt,
and genuine investment at t as,
It = ptdKt/dt + mtdQt/dt + rtdPt/dt. (120)
Equation (120) says that defensive expenditure against pollution ought to be included in the
estimation of genuine investment (mtdQt/dt), but, then, so should changes in the quality of the
environment be included (rtdPt/dt). To include the former, but not the latter, would be a mistake.
13. Population Change and Sustainable Development
How does demographic change affect the index of sustainable development? There are a
number of conceptual problems inherent in the welfare economics of reproductive behaviour that
still remain usettled. Such problems have typically been bypassed in growth accounting; instead,
it has been customary there to regard changes in population to be exogenously given. We follow
that practice here.
36
We seek to determine how population change influences the drift term (MVt/Mt) on the RHS
of equation (8). An equivalent way of casting the problem is to regard population as a capital asset.
Once we do that, what could appear to be a non-autonomous model reduces to an autonomous one.
To illustrate, we adopt a natural extension of Harsanyi (1955) by regarding social welfare to be the
average utility of all who are ever born. We formalize this 'dynamic average utilitarianism' as
follows:
Let Nt be population size at t and n(Nt) the percentage rate of change of Nt.
37 For notational
simplicity, we ignore intragenerational inequality and changes in the age composition of the
population. Let ct denote per capita consumption at t. If Ct is aggregate consumption, ct = Ct/Nt.
Assume as before that labour is supplied inelastically in each period. Current utility of the
representative person is U(ct) and social wefare is,
Vt = t*4NJU(cJ)exp(-*(J-t))dJ/t*4NJexp(-*(J-t))dJ.
38 (121)
If Vt is to be well-defined, we need to suppose that there exists , > 0, such that (* - ,)t >
0*
tn(NJ)dJ for large enough t. Notice though that, once we are given the population forecast, the
denominator in (121) is independent of the policies that could be chosen at t. This means that a     
39 In Dasgupta (2001b) Theorem 6 was invoked to assess whether the world's poorest regions
have experienced sustainable development in the recent past.
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policy deemed to be optimal if (121) were used as the criterion of choice would also be judged to
be optimal if instead social welfare Vt were taken to be of the form,
Vt = t*4NJU(cJ)exp(-*(J-t))dJ. (122)
But for assessing whether or not a pattern of development sustains Vt, it matters whether Vt is taken
to be (121) or (122).
Let Kit denote the stock of the ith type of capital good and write kit = Kit/Nt. We now express
by kt the vector of capital stocks per head. The state variables are therefore kt and Nt. We take it that
" is autonomous. Then equation (121) implies that
Vt = V(kt, Nt). (123)
Let the numeraire be utility. Define <t = MVt/MNt. It is the contribution of an additional
person at t to social well-being. <t is the accounting price of a person (as distinct from the
accounting price of a person's human capital). Note that <t can be negative, depending on initial
conditions at t and on the resource allocation mechanism.
Let pit denote the accounting price of kit. Equation (123) then implies
dVt/dt = Eipitdkit/dt + <tdNt/dt. (124)
The RHS of equation (124) is genuine investment, inclusive of the change in the size of the
population. It generalizes equation (8). We conclude that Proposition 1 remains valid so long as
wealth comparisons mean comparisons of wealth per capita, adjusted for demographic changes.
In Arrow, Dasgupta, and Mäler (2003), we have studied optimal economies in which the
adjustment term (<tdNt/dt) is not negligible, but nevertheless can be estimated in a simple way.
Dasgupta (2001b) identified a set of circumstances where the term vanishes even in an imperfect
economy. Suppose (i) n(Nt) is independent of Nt; (ii) all the production processes are linear; and (iii)
ct = c(kt), meaning that under the resource allocation mechanism ", per capita consumption is not
a function of population size. In such circumstances Vt is independent of Nt (i.e. <t = 0) and, so,
equation (124) reduces to
dVt/dt = Eipitdkit/dt. (125)
This finding can be summarised as
Theorem 6 If (i) n(Nt) is independent of Nt, (ii) all the production processes are linear,
and (iii) ct = c(kt), then social welfare is sustained at a point in time if and only if the value of
the changes in per capita capital assets at that instant is non-negative.
The conditions underlying Theorem 6 are overly strong. It is tempting nevertheless to regard
the value of changes in the per capita stocks of capital assets as a first approximation of dVt/dt and
then to estimate correction terms that reflect departures from the conditions underlying the theorem.
That investigation is left for future work.
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14. Uncertain Productivity     
40 Estimates of the elasticity of marginal utility obtained from consumer behaviour, or,
alternatively, from consumer responses to questions, have typically been in the range 1.5-2.5. The
evidence thus acquired does not of course reflect what we mean by 0 here, but it is close enough.
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How does future uncertainty in the productivity of capital assets influence accounting
prices? In order to study this question in the simplest possible way, we revert to the Ramsey-Solow
model of Section 3 and assume that the productivity of the single asset is uncertain.  Analytically
it is easiest to imagine that the underlying stochastic process generates a return on investment that
is independently and identically distributed (iid) in each period. For convenience we now suppose
that time is discrete (t = 0,1,2,...). In what follows we indicate that a variable is random by placing
a tilde over it. Let us denote the uncertain productivity of investment at date t by   # :t. We assume that
  # :t is non-negative and that the distribution of   # :t is atomless.
Population is assumed to be a constant and aggregate saving is taken to be a constant
proportion, s, of wealth, where 0 < s < 1. At each t the size of the capital stock that has been
inherited from the previous period is a known quantity. Consumption is a fixed proportion (1-s) of
that inherited stock. Therefore, assuming that capital does not deteriorate, the discrete time,
stochastic counterpart of the accumulation equation (19) is,
  # Kt+1 = (Kt - Ct)  # :t,
from which we conclude that
  # Kt+1 = s  # :tKt, t $ 0,
and thus,
  # CJ = (1-s)Kt[tJ
(J-1)(s  # :k)], for J > t $ 0. (126)
Writing by U(C) the utility of consumption, we take it that social welfare (V) is the expected value
of the sum of discounted utilities over time. Letting E denote the expectation operator, this means
that
Vt = E[tE4U(  # CJ)$
(J-t)], where $ / 1/(1+*) and * > 0. (127)
Suppose utility is iso-elastic. Let 0 be the elasticity of marginal utility. We consider the
empirically interesting case, 0 > 1.
40 We write U as:
U(C) = C
1-0/(1-0), where  0 > 1. (128)
In (128), U is bounded above, but is unbounded below.
Write E(  # :t
(1-0)) = E(  # :
(1-0)). If Vt is to be well-defined, we must now suppose that
$s
(1-0)E(  # :
(1-0)) < 1. (129)





(1-0)E(  # :
(1-0))],
and, so, deduce that the asset's accounting price is
pt = MVt/MKt = (1-s)
(1-0)Kt
-0/[1 - $s
(1-0)E(  # :
(1-0))]. (130)
How would changes in the distribution of   # :J (J $ t) affect pt? To study this, imagine that     
41 The reader can confirm that if 0 < 0 < 1 in (128), then dpt/d  6 : > 0 and dpt/dF
2 < 0; and if 0
= 1 (i.e., U(C) = log C), then dpt/d  6 : = dpt/dF
2 = 0. See the following footnote for an intuitive
explanation for these results.
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log(  # :t) is normally distributed with mean m and variance F
2. Denote the mean of   # :t by   6 :. In that
case, we know that
  6 : = exp(m + F
2/2), (131)
E(  # :
(1-0)) =   6 :
(1-0)exp(-0(1-0)F
2/2), (132)
and var(  # :) =   6 :
2[exp(F
2) - 1]. (133)
From (130)-(133) we confirm that, holding var(  # :) constant, dpt/d  6 : < 0. To study the effect
of an increase in var(  # :) on pt, while keeping   6 : constant, we must allow F to increase in such a way
that (m + F
2/2) remains unchanged. It is now a simple matter to confirm that Mpt/M(F
2) > 0. And so,
we have
Theorem 7 Other things the same, (i) if the expected return on investment were to
increase, the assets' accounting price would decrease, and (ii) if the underlying risk in the asset's
productivity were to increase, so would its accounting price increase.
Part (i) of Theorem 7 says that an increase in the expected rate of return on investment
would lead to a decrease in the asset's accounting price, other things the same. But Part (ii) is also
consistent with intuition. From (128) we know that utility, while bounded above, is unbounded
below. We would then expect Vt to be particularly sensitive to the downside risk in   # :. Part (ii) of
Theorem 7 says that if the risk in   # : were to increase, the asset (at the margin) would become more
valuable - other things the same. The Theorem's message should be expected to be even stronger
if the underlying transformation possibilities among goods and services were to display thresholds,
or, more generally, ecological non-convexities of the kind that is present in the model of the shallow
lake (Section 4).
41
Of course, consumers could be expected to respond to an increase in the mean return on
investment, or to an increase in uncertainty in the return. What would be their response? We cannot
tell unless we model the economic environment in which various parties make their saving
decisions. The simplest place to look is an environment where the saving rate is optimal. There,
people's response to a change in risk is also optimal. Levhari and Srinivasan (1969) have shown that
in the model economy being studied here, if U is homogeneous of degree (1-0) in C, the optimal
saving ratio (s*) is the solution of the equation,
s0 = $E(  # :
(1-0)). (134)
Let us continue to assume that 0 > 1. From (130) and (134) we conclude that if the saving rate is
optimal, then, other things the same, an increase in the expected return on investment leads to a
decline in the accounting price of capital (i.e., dpt/d  6 : < 0), and an increase in the riskyness of return     
42 The reader can confirm that if 0 < 0 < 1 in (128) and (134), then dpt/d  6 : > 0 and dpt/dF
2 < 0.
To understand the result, note that if 0 < 0 < 1, then U is unbounded above, but bounded below.
0 = 1 corresponds to the case where U(C) = log C. In this case s* is independent of both   6 :
and F
2, and so dpt/d  6 : = dpt/dF
2= 0. The opposite pulls arising from the unboundedness of U at both
ends cancel each other. See Hahn (1970) for an intuitive explanation for the way 0 influences the
relationship between F and s*.
     
43 See, for example, Murray (1993).
     
44 On this see Dasgupta (1993).
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leads to an increase in the accounting price (i.e., dpt/dF
2 > 0).
42
Accounting prices of capital assets (as opposed to their market prices) are rarely estimated;
but when they are, the estimates are mostly made on the basis of economic models that eschew
uncertainty. The general moral of our finding here is that such studies underestimate the social
worth of those assets.
15 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have explored the way welfare analysis can be conducted in imperfect
economies. In Sections 2-3 it was confirmed that the same set of accounting prices should be used
both for the evaluation of policy reforms (e.g., project evaluation) and for assessing whether the
economic programme being pursued sustains intergenerational welfare. In Sections 5-14 we studied
the properties of accounting prices of environmental natural resources under a variety of
institutional arrangements. We showed that for a number of cases it is possible to derive simple
formulae for accounting prices. It was found that under plausible values of the relevant parameters,
accounting prices of goods and services can be substantially different from their market prices.
A large empirical literature in ecology and epidemiology offers evidence that ecological
processes are driven by non-convex transformation possibilities.
43 We note here in passing that
metabolic processes also involve non-convex functional relationships between nutrition intake and
nutritional status.
44 It was confirmed that accounting prices can be used in non-convex
environments (Section 4). Our hope is that the methods developed here will be of use not only in
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